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STANLEY FIELDS*

Leaving Wildlife out of National
Wildlife Refuges: The Irony of
Wyoming v. United States**
ABSTRACT
During the twentieth century, the federal government has
engaged in an increasing number of conflicts with state
governments over the management of wildlife. Many of these
conflicts have concerned the management of wildlife that is
sometimes on federal land. This article uses Wyoming v. United
States as a prism with which to analyze the application of the
National Wildlife Refuge System
Improvement Act
(Improvement Act) and its impacts on wildlife management. The
Tenth circuit's application of the Act is examined in the
framework of law and science. Legally, the article considers the
Tenth Circuit's applicationof the Improvement Act in the context
of the Tenth Amendment, related sovereignty issues, case law,
and the Act itself. Scientifically, the article considers the
impracticalities of the court's opinion in the context of wildlife
and disease management. Possible alternatives to the Tenth
Circuit's interpretationand application of the Improvement Act
are also presented. The ultimate conclusion is that the court's
interpretations and rulings regarding the Improvement Act
provide confusion and inconsistency in the interpretation and
application of the Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wyoming v. United States,1 the state of Wyoming requested
permission to vaccinate elk on the National Elk Refuge (NER), a part of
* The author wishes to express his gratitude to the many people who were
instrumental in completing this article. Special thanks go to Professor Sheryl Wolf for all of
her time, effort, and suggestions. Both Samantha Adams and Professor Barbara Blumenfeld
supplied insightful suggestions that provided increased depth and refinement of this
article. Mr. Fields received his Bachelor's degree in Zoology from Western New Mexico
University in 1997, his Master's degree in Biology from Eastern New Mexico University in
2001, and his J.D. from the University of New Mexico School of Law in 2004. He is
currently an Assistant Attorney General with the Natural Resources Section of the Alaska
Department of Law in Juneau, Alaska.
- This article was originally published in 34 NEW MExICo LAW REVIEw 217 (2004).
1. 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002).
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the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) located within Wyoming.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) subsequently rejected the
request. 2 Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the Tenth
Amendment does not reserve to the states a right to manage wildlife on
3
federal lands, "regardless of the circumstances." The court also held
that, even though the USFWS had discretion to determine whether
proposed activities on wildlife refuges were consistent with the goals of
the National Wildlife Refuge System 4Improvement Act (Improvement
Act), this discretion was not unlimited.
This article will first examine the Wyoming decision in the
context of the Tenth Amendment and related state sovereignty doctrines.
Second, this article will consider the expansion of federal authority over
wildlife management as it pertains to Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
and the Improvement Act. Lastly, this article will examine the impact of
the Wyoming decision on wildlife law and future cases in the Tenth
Circuit.
This article concludes that the court's ultimate interpretations
in regard to the Improvement Act provide confusion and
rulings
and
inconsistency in the interpretation and application of the Act. Novel and
cursorily dismissed ideas for resolving conflict over authority to manage
wildlife are presented in an effort to provide alternative strategies for
reducing this confusion and inconsistency, all while increasing fidelity to
the purpose of the Improvement Act and the National Wildlife Refuge
System. These ideas are presented for consideration as possible
alternatives to the Wyoming court's resolution of the issues examined.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Brucellosis is caused by the bacteria Brucella abortus and can
result in spontaneous abortion, arthritis, lameness, and/or steriiity in
hoofed animals. 5 This disease has been documented to occur in cattle
and elk in Wyoming. 6 There is also evidence that brucellosis can be

2. Id. at 1222 (Unless otherwise stated, all factual information is from Wyoming v.
United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002)).
3. "[Tlhe Tenth Amendment does not reserve to the State of Wyoming the right to
manage wildlife, or more specifically vaccinate elk, on the NER, regardless of the
circumstances." Id. at 1227.
4. Id. at 1237-38.
5. Id. at 1218-19.
6. Robert B. Keiter & Peter H. Froelicher, Bison, Brucellosis, and Law in the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem, 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1993).
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spread between species. 7 In 1985, the state of Wyoming began a
brucellosis vaccination program on state lands. 8 In the early 1990s, the
state reported a seventy percent calving success rate for vaccinated
animals compared with thirty percent for elk that had not been
vaccinated. 9
In November of 1997, approximately twelve years after the
vaccine had been put to use, the state of Wyoming requested permission
from the USFWS to vaccinate elk for brucellosis on the NER.10 The goal
of the proposed action was to diminish the chances of spreading the
disease from elk on the NER to elk and cattle off the refuge." Since the
USFWS failed to respond to the initial request, in January of 1998 the
state then proposed to undertake the vaccination program at its own cost
and to "indemnify and hold harmless" the USFWS for any claims arising
from the program.' 2 The USFWS did eventually respond by rejecting the
state's request, claiming there was not enough information to find the
vaccine "safe and effective." 13 At the same time, the USFWS failed to
supply evidence contradicting the state's claims concerning the safety
and efficacy of the vaccine. 14 Furthermore, the USFWS failed to propose
any alternative plans to stem the spread of the disease.' 5 Wyoming then
filed suit in federal district court under the Tenth Amendment and the
Improvement Act, claiming that the USFWS had interfered with the
state's right to manage wildlife within the state. 16 Wyoming
7. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Facts About Brucellosis, available at http://www.
aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/brucellosis/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2003); Environment News
Service, Hundreds of Yellowstone Bison Killed for Roaming, available at http://ensnews.com/ens/mar2003/2003-03-06-10.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2003) ("[E]Ik can carry
brucellosis and there are documented cases of transmission from elk to cattle."); Wyoming,
279 F.3d at 1220 ("transmit[tal] [of] brucellosis from elk to cattle in confined conditions").
8. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1220.
9. Id.
10. Id.at 1221
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1221-22.
14. Id. at 1240.
15. Wyoming v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1222-23 (D. Wyo. 1999) ("Only the
poor, dumb creatures of the wild suffer as this disease spreads while the FWS dithers over
whether Wyoming's vaccination program has imperfections. That Wyoming's program
may not be perfect is not a sine qua non, but it at least is moving forward to do something
about a serious, spreading wildlife disease. The Court is sorry that this patchwork of
federal law gives the Secretary room to play out his stalling game while doing nothing.")
(emphasis added), affd in partand rev'd in part, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002); Wyoming, 279
F.3d at 1241 ("[W]e are faced with a situation where the program, or lack thereof, by one
sovereign allegedly impairs the meaningful accomplishment of another sovereign's
responsibilities.") (emphasis added).
16. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1222-23.
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subsequently added a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act
17
(APA) for review of the agency's decision to reject the state's request.
The district court granted the motion of the United States to dismiss on
18
all counts, and Wyoming subsequently filed an appeal.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.19 The
court held that the Tenth Amendment does not reserve the right to
manage wildlife to the states, "regardless of the circumstances," 20 and
that the Improvement Act granted the USFWS authority to determine
whether vaccination of elk on the NER conflicted with the goals of the
Improvement Act. 21 Nonetheless, in regard to the state's APA claim, the
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the USFWS had
unlimited discretion to determine whether proposed activities were
contrary to the Improvement Act. 22
III. BACKGROUND
The complexity of this case arises from the intersection of Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence and the concept of federal preemption. The
basis of state wildlife management authority has been couched in terms
of sovereign authority and authority reserved under the Tenth
Amendment. 23 The issue of federal preemption primarily depends upon
whether the language of the Improvement Act clearly and explicitly
states Congress's intent to preempt applicable state law. 24 Further
complicating the issue as to how the Tenth Amendment and state
sovereignty claims should be addressed, the Tenth Amendment's power
has waxed and waned throughout history and the judiciary has
struggled to define and apply the Tenth Amendment consistently. 25
In this case, the Tenth Circuit was asked to examine three
challenges to the authority claimed by the USFWS under the
Improvement Act: first, whether state authority to manage terrestrial
wildlife on federal lands within the state's borders was a right retained
17. Id. at 1222.
18. Id. at 1223-24.
19. Id. at 1241.
20. Id. at 1227.
21. Id. at 1235.
22. Id. at 1237-39.
23. See generally Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416 (1920); Abby Dodge v. United States, 223 U.S. 166 (1912); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S.
519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); McCready v. Virginia, 94
U.S. 391 (1876); N.M. State Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1969).
24. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
25.

LAURENCE H.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-13

(3d ed. 2000)

("Vacillating attitudes regarding federalism and the importance of state sovereignty....").
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under the Tenth Amendment; 26 second, whether the Congressional grant
of authority to the agency under the Improvement Act preempted state
authority regarding wildlife management on federal wildlife refuges; 27
and finally, whether the Improvement Act allowed judicial review of the
agency's decision under the APA. 28 Review of state authority to manage
wildlife has often been viewed in the context of the Tenth Amendment
and related sovereign authority. 29 Thus, it is appropriate to undertake a
thorough analysis of the basis for state wildlife management in the
context of the Tenth Amendment and related jurisprudence.
A. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." 30 This amendment reserves authority to the states and to the
people if authority has not been expressly reserved to the federal
government or precluded from the states or people by the Constitution. 31
At the same time, the Property Clause 32 empowers the federal
government to exercise control over federal property within a state, 33
and state authority does not extend to federal lands when state law is
contrary to federal law or policy. 34 The Property Clause grants Congress
"the power to make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." 35 However,
state authority is not preempted unless Congress has enacted legislation

26. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1222-24.
27. Id. at 1222-23.
28. Id. at 1223-24.
29. See generally Hunt, 278 U.S. 96; Holland, 252 U.S. 416; Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166; Geer,
161 U.S. 519, overruled by Hughes, 441 U.S. 322; McCready, 94 U.S. 391; N.M. State Game
Comm'n, 410 F.2d 1197.
30.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

31. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 5-12 ("[The Tenth Amendment] serves as an instruction on
how to read the Constitution's silences with respect to national governmental authority. On
that subject, the Tenth Amendment indicates, constitutional silence constitutes negation.").
32. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to
Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.").
33. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976).
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2.
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that overrides conflicting state law 36 by one of the delineated methods of
37
preemption.
38
In Wyoming, the Tenth Amendment claim and Property Clause
and preemption issues are highly interrelated. The Tenth Amendment
claim can be affected by how broadly the Property Clause is interpreted
or by whether there is preemption by the Improvement Act itself. For
example, if the Property Clause is interpreted to grant Congress
unlimited authority and discretion to manage federal lands (and the
wildlife on those lands), then preemption under the Improvement Act is
unnecessary because the Tenth Amendment is inapplicable. 39 On the
other hand, if the Property Clause is not interpreted to include such
broad and implicit authority, then the Improvement Act must expressly
preempt state law in the wildlife management context. 4°
The Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty did not fare
particularly well during the period between the early twentieth century
and 1976.41 During that span, the focus was largely on the ability of
Congress to impose minimum wage and overtime pay standards on
states. 42 In the wildlife law context, the Supreme Court held that the
Tenth Amendment must give way to the treaty power expressly granted

36. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203-04.
37. There are generally three ways that federal law can preempt state law. Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203-04. First, Congress can use "explicit preemptive language." Id. at
203. Second, a
scheme of federal regulation [may be] so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it,' because 'the
Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject,' or because 'the object sought to be
obtained by the federal law and the character of the obligations imposed
by it may reveal the same purpose.
Id. at 204 (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982)).Finally, federal preemption of state law occurs when "compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility," id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1962)), or where state law "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id.
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
2.
38. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
39. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
superceded by Franklin v. City of Kettering, 246 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2001); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. of Dist. of
Colo. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
40. See generally Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203-04; supra note 37.
41. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 5-11.
42. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruledby Garcia,469 U.S. 528.
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to Congress in the Constitution 43 as well as the authority in both the
Commerce 44 and Property Clauses. 45 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has consistently relied upon the Tenth Amendment and related
principles of sovereignty to substantiate state authority to regulate
wildlife in their state, and that this authority existed prior to the United
States. 46 More importantly, failing to recognize both the substantive
authority of the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty is inconsistent
with recent Supreme Court decisions on the subject. For example, in
United States v. Lopez 47 and United States v. Morrison,48 the Supreme Court
recognized that the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism
require earnest analysis to ensure that Congress does not exceed its
limitations and intrude upon authority retained by states. 49
B. The National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act
The Improvement Act was enacted in 1997, and its purpose is
"to administer a national network of lands and waters for the
conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the
fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United
States for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans." 50
43. See State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) ("To answer this question
it is not enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to
the United States, because by Article 2, Section 2, the power to make treaties is delegated
expressly, and by Article 6 treaties made under the authority of the United States, along
with the Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, are
declared the supreme law of the land.").
44. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,327 (1979).
45. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-41 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543; Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. at 175-76; Geer, 161 U.S. at 534,
overruled by Hughes, 441 U.S. 322; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 265-66 (1891);
McCready, 94 U.S. at 394.
47. 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., concurring) ("While the
intrusion on state sovereignty may not be as severe in this instance as in some of our recent
Tenth Amendment cases, the intrusion is nonetheless significant. Absent a stronger
connection or identification with commercial concerns that are central to the Commerce
Clause, that interference contradicts the federal balance the Framers designed and that this
Court is obliged to enforce."); id. at 592 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Even before the passage
of the Tenth Amendment, it was apparent that Congress would possess only those powers
'herein granted' by the rest of the Constitution.").
48. 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or
more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.").
49. It is appropriate to note the breadth of Commerce Clause jurisdiction, the criminal
law nature of the legislation under review in Lopez and Morrison, and that state dominance
in the area of wildlife management is comparable to criminal law. Therefore, analysis of
state authority over wildlife management in the context of the Property Clause should be
similar.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000).
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The Act further states that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as
affecting the authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States
to manage, control, or regulate fish and resident wildlife under State law
or regulations in any area within the System." 5'
In Wyoming, the Tenth Circuit found these two sentences
incongruent and held that the clause purporting to allow states to retain
authority over wildlife on national wildlife refuges in the Improvement
Act could not be interpreted as such because it would destroy the goal
"to administer a national network of lands."5 2 Since the Wyoming court
interpreted the phrase "to administer a national network of lands" as the
primary goal of the Act, the court concluded that the clause reserving
authority to the states should not be construed as it is written because to
do so would undermine the purpose of the Act. 53
C. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
Under the APA, an agency's decision can be overturned if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 54 Although deference to agency decisions is the
standard,55 there must be evidence that the agency considered the
56
relevant information available to it at the time it made a decision.
In Wyoming, the Tenth Circuit primarily relied upon the
Improvement Act's requirement that the USFWS comply with state
policies and objectives to the "extent practicable" 57 and the Act's
58
legislative history to conclude that judicial review was appropriate.
After reviewing the agency's decision, the court found that the burden
rested upon the USFWS to demonstrate that it had considered all
relevant information available for review and based its decision on the
information it had.5 9 Since the state claimed that there was reliable
evidence supporting the efficacy of the vaccination program, and that the
USFWS did not address this evidence, Wyoming had met the minimum
60
burden requiring review of the APA claim.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
(1971)).
60.

16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2000).
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234.
Id. at 1234-35.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
Id. at 843.
16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1)(A)(iii) (2000).
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1237.
Id. at 1238 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1239.

Fall 20041

WYOMING V. UNITED STATES

1219

To summarize, Wyoming's claims presented the court with the
opportunity to analyze state authority to manage wildlife on national
wildlife refuges under the Tenth Amendment, Congressional intent to
preempt state law under the Improvement Act, and the authority of the
judiciary to review agency decisions under the Improvement Act and the
APA. Analysis of these issues diverges because of their distinct historical
contexts and development. The question regarding management of
wildlife under the Tenth Amendment brings with it hundreds of years of
judicial precedent, history, and tradition. 61 The remaining two questions
both rely on the Improvement Act itself. There has not been as much
precedent addressing the Improvement Act issues presented to the court
in Wyoming because the Act was enacted in 1997, which is relatively
recent.
IV. RATIONALE
The rationale used by the Wyoming court to decide these three
primary issues is presented for a more complete understanding of the
case. If the court's rationale was not expressly stated, its implicit
rationale is presented. The rationale used to decide the Tenth
Amendment challenge is presented at the outset, then the preemption
challenge, and, finally, the APA challenge under the Improvement Act.
A. The Tenth Amendment and the Property Clause
Wyoming acknowledged that the Property Clause does not act as
an automatic withdrawal of all federal land from state jurisdiction. 62 The
court stated that "[t]he Property Clause simply empowers Congress to
exercise jurisdiction over federal land within a State if Congress so
chooses." 63 The court also acknowledged the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 64 where it stated, "the 'complete power' that
Congress has over public lands necessarily includes the power to
regulate and protect the wildlife living there." 65 The Tenth Circuit then
concluded that "the Tenth Amendment does not reserve to the state of

61. See supra note 46.
62. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1226.
63. Id. at 1227.
64. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
65. Id. at 540-41 (analyzing whether the federal government could preclude the state
from capturing, removing, and selling protected animals from federal lands under the
federal Wild Horses and Burros Act of 1971, 16 U.S.C. § 1331).
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Wyoming the right to manage wildlife, or more specifically to vaccinate
elk, on the NER, regardless of the circumstances." 66
The court did recognize, however, that "states have possessed
'broad trustee and police powers over the.., wildlife within their borders,
67
including...wildlife found on Federal lands within a State."
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the authority exercised by states
when managing wildlife on federal lands was not "constitutionally69
based"; 68 therefore, it was not a constitutionally protected authority.
The Wyoming court did not expand its explanation of the rule but
ultimately concluded that the Property Clause implicitly delegates to the
United States the power to exclusively regulate and manage wildlife on
federal lands. 70 This power is primarily based upon the Supreme Court's
holding in Kleppe that "the Property Clause also gives Congress the
power to protect wildlife on the public lands, state law
notwithstanding." 71
B. Preemption under the Improvement Act
The authority of the USFWS under the Improvement Act to
exclude state management, "regardless of the circumstances," depends
upon the construction of the Improvement Act itself. 72 The court
analyzed the text to determine whether the Act grants authority to the
USFWS to essentially preempt all state management of wildlife on
national wildlife refuges within the state of Wyoming. Specifically, the
Improvement Act must demonstrate that there was a "clear and manifest
purpose of Congress" to supercede state law when enacting the
legislation. 73
In reaching its conclusion that the Improvement Act preempts
state authority to manage wildlife on federal lands, the court relied upon
a clause in the Improvement Act stating that the "mission" is "to
administer a national network of lands." 74 The court interpreted this
portion of the Improvement Act as its primary purpose, 75 and that this
purpose could only be met if the Improvement Act were interpreted to
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1227.
Id. at 1226 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 24.3).
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Id.
Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 546.
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1227.
Id. at 1231 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
Id. at 1234.
Id.
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"supercede" state law.7 6 Consequently, the court found that, in order for
a federal agency to manage wildlife on the NER according to the
Improvement Act, it must be able to exclude state management authority
"regardless of the circumstances." 77
C. Review of the USFWS Decision under the APA
The court recognized that agency actions are subject to judicial
review 78 unless "statutes preclude judicial review, or agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." 79 The court maintained that
"[]udicial review of final agency action by an aggrieved person will not
cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the
8°
purpose of Congress."
Upon reviewing the text of the Improvement Act, the court
found insufficient evidence to support a finding that Congress sought to
preclude judicial review of agency decisions under the Act. 81 This
finding was based upon Improvement Act language that states, "the
Secretary shall ensure effective coordination, interaction, and
cooperation with owners of land adjoining refuges and the fish and
wildlife agency of the States in which the units of the System are
located." 82 Since the court perceived this language to operate as a
limitation on the Secretary, 83 the court ultimately concluded that there
was not a grant of unlimited discretion prohibiting judicial review. 84

V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
Key issues raised in Wyoming will be analyzed separately: first,
the Tenth Amendment analysis and state authority to manage wildlife;85
second, issues regarding preemption; 86 and third, review under the
APA. 87 Each analysis will discuss legal and applied background, the
court's decision, and possible implications.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 1234-35.
Id.at 1236.
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000)).
Id. (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)).
Id.
Nat'l Wildlife Sys. Improvement Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(e) (2003).
Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1236.
Id.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
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A. The Tenth Amendment and State Authority to Manage Wildlife
The Tenth Amendment's substantive power has oscillated
throughout history and currently appears to be ascending. 88 For this
reason, it is necessary that Wyoming's Tenth Amendment claim be
thoroughly analyzed. Thorough analysis will offer insight and guidance
for the review of similar claims in the future and will afford proper legal
analysis of state sovereignty claims under the Tenth Amendment.
With the recent waxing of state sovereignty, 89 Wyoming appears
to have provided an excessively cursory examination of the state's Tenth
Amendment claim. As the Supreme Court of the United States has
stated,
The powers delegated by the.. .Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which... .remain in
the State governments are numerous and indefinite...The
powers reserved to the several States... .extend to all objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.90
Even though one may challenge the effectiveness of the dual
system of sovereignty in restraining infringements by the U.S.
government on state sovereignty, there is no question regarding the
federal design to do so. 91 The Supreme Court has repeatedly adhered to
the axiom that states possess concurrent sovereignty that is conditioned
only upon the Supremacy Clause itself. 92 If the Constitution does not
speak directly upon an issue, then the U.S. government still might
93
preclude state authority in a certain field under the Supremacy Clause.
In situations where the Constitution does not specifically address an
issue, the question ultimately becomes one of preemption. In other
words, since the Constitution clearly does not expressly wrest wildlife
management from the states, it must be determined whether the federal
government enacted laws that do so.
The purpose of the Tenth Amendment is to protect the states and
people from unconstitutional intrusions by the federal government. 94 To
88.
89.
90.
292-93
91.
92.
93.
94.

See supra notes 24, 47-49.
Id.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45 at
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459.
Id. at 457 (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)); Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543.
See, e.g., supra note 37.
TRIBE, supranote 25, § 5-12.
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accomplish this goal, explicit preemptive language is generally required
to demonstrate Congress's clear intent to preempt state law in an area
the states have traditionally controlled. 95
Management of wildlife has been found by the Supreme Court
to "remain under the exclusive control of the State." 96 The primary
exceptions include enforcement of international treaties where the
federal government has agreed with a foreign nation on the management
of species transitorily within individual states, 97 when wildlife is in the
stream of commerce, 98 when Congress explicitly preempts state
management on federal lands under the Supremacy Clause, 99 where
wildlife damages the property of the United States,1mo or where the
federal government is attempting to determine what animals "may be
detrimentalto the use of [a national] park." 101
There is a fundamental expectation that a regulation intended to
preempt state law will clearly state this intention.1 02 As the Supreme
Court explained in California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock
Company,10 3 this expectation exists
because agencies normally address problems in a detailed
manner and can speak through a variety of means... .we can
expect that they will make their intentions clear if they
intend for their regulations to be exclusive.... [I]f an agency
does not speak to the question of preemption, we will
pause before saying that the mere volume and complexity
of its regulations indicate that the agency did in fact intend
to preempt. 104

95. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230;
TRIBE, supra note 25, § 6-31.
96. McCready, 94 U.S. at 395.
97. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
98. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 339 ("[W]hen a wild animal 'becomes an article of
commerce...its use cannot be limited to the citizens of one State to the exclusion of citizens
of another State.'" (quoting Geer, 161 U.S. at 538)).
99. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543 ("[W]hen Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily
overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause.").
100. Hunt, 278 U.S. at 100.
101. N.M. State Game Comm'n, 410 F.2d at 1201.
102. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230;
TRIBE, supra note 25, § 6-31.
103. 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
104. Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987) (quoting
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985)).
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Upon examining agency regulations promulgated under the
Mining Act of 1872,105 the Supreme Court went on to state that "[it is
impossible to divine from...regulations, which expressly contemplate
coincident compliance with state law as well as federal law, an intention
1
to preempt all state regulation0..... 6 In Wyoming, the problem is
identical. The legislation at issue also "expressly contemplates coincident
upon which
compliance with state law." In fact, this is the requirement
10 7
review.
judicial
for
finding
its
the Tenth Circuit bases
Even so, in order to truly assess the merits of the Tenth
Amendment and state sovereignty claim, it is important to separate the
Tenth Amendment issues from those issues surrounding preemption.
The question of whether there is Tenth Amendment and state sovereign
18
authority tends to become entangled with discussion of preemption.
Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty analysis consists of
determining whether the U.S. Constitution preserved state authority to
manage wildlife.
The Property Clause was cited by the Wyoming court as
constitutionally granting the United States the authority to exclusively
1°9
This
manage wildlife on federal lands within sovereign states.
interpretation of the Property Clause has four primary difficulties. First,
it fails to differentiate "the Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the territory or other property
0
belonging to the United States""n from the presence of wild animals on
such property. A familiar concept in wildlife law is that wild animals are
not regarded as property and regulation of them can only occur through
sovereign authority over the land on which the animal is found at a
particular time."' Therefore, there is a need for substantive analysis of
states' rights when state authority is allegedly preempted. The need for
substantive analysis is especially apparent in situations where the legal
province targeted by a claim of preemption has long been dominated by
the states.

105. Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 26 (2003).
106. Cal. CoastalComm'n, 480 U.S. at 584.
107. See Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1237.
108. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 25, § 6-2 (providing a discussion of preemption and
"reverse preemption" of state laws in the context of the Commerce Clause).
109. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1227.
2 (emphasis added).
110. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
111. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 434; Geer, 161 U.S. at 529, overruled by Hughes, 441 U.S. at
339; Criminal Jurisdiction of Utah over Non-Indians Hunting on the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation in Violation of State Law, Dept. of the Interior Solicitor's Op. 78 101, 102 (1971).
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The second difficulty arises when there is concurrent sovereignty
over a particular property, which is often the case with federal lands.1 12
It is common knowledge that the management of wildlife on federal
lands is primarily undertaken by the state in which the federal property
is located.11 3 This is not to say that the federal government could not and
does not preempt state law as it pertains to federal property, but, in
circumstances such as those in Wyoming, it must do so clearly and
explicitly.11 4 In Wyoming, Tenth Amendment analysis concerns whether
the state has a constitutional claim under the Tenth Amendment and
related principles, not whether the Improvement Act "clearly and
manifestly" states an intention to preempt state wildlife management on
the NER.115 In other words, the issue raised under the Tenth
Amendment claim should be isolated from the issue concerning
preemption under the Improvement Act. This will help to ensure proper
analysis of the Tenth Amendment claim. Therefore, focus should be on
the source of the state's authority to manage wildlife (i.e., from where the
state's authority to manage wildlife ultimately emanates).
A third difficulty with the reasoning in Wyoming is that it
equates Property Clause authority with management of wildlife on
federal lands. Wyoming appears to have largely, and erroneously, relied
upon Supreme Court dicta that stated, "the power over public
land...entrusted to Congress is without limitations."16 If that were so,
the authors of the Property Clause could have easily stated such without
using additional qualifiers that denote limitations on the grant of this

112. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 25, § 5-8 at 848-50 (discussing the intricacies of dual
sovereignty over federal lands).
113. See, e.g., Wyoming Game and Fish Dep't, 2002 Deer Hunting Season, available at
http://gf.state.wy.us/admin/regulations/chapter6/ch6deer.htm
(last visited Oct. 10,
2003) (defining hunting seasons and bag limits for federal and non-federal lands); N.M.
Dep't of Game and Fish, 2003-2004 Hunting Proclamation, available at http://www.
gmfsh.state.nm.us/PageMiUImages/Hunting/biggamerib03_04.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,
2003) (defining hunting seasons, bag limits, and fire arm and ammunition restrictions for
federal and non-federal lands). From personal observation, it is indeed a rare occasion
when a federal employee is seen on federal lands (e.g., National Forest lands, Bureau of
Land Management lands, etc.) during hunting season. On the other hand, it is quite
common to observe many state game officials monitoring hunters and establishing
roadblocks to determine harvest numbers and to ensure all hunters are properly licensed,
attired, not intoxicated, etc. The hunting proclamations issued by states include federal
lands. State management on these lands is logical because of the practicality and increased
ease of regulatory application.
114. See Gregory,501 U.S. at 460; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230;
TRIBE, supra note 25, § 6-31.
115. See generally supra note 37.
116. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 529).
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authority. 117 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit's recognition of such
impractical dicta as law all but ignores the Supreme Court's holding in
Kleppe that "[aibsent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains
jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress.. .retains
the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the
Property Clause."118 The Wyoming court has failed to recognize any
jurisdiction by the state of Wyoming over wildlife on federal lands and
119
is, therefore, squarely at odds with Supreme Court precedent.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit relies heavily upon the Supreme
Court's holding in Kleppe that "the Property Clause also gives Congress
the power to protect wildlife on public lands, state law
notwithstanding." 120 Difficulties here stem from the fact that the
Supreme Court also recognized state authority to manage wildlife on
121
something Wyoming did not do.
federal lands absent preemption,
Furthermore, Kleppe interpreted the Property Clause to grant a "power to
122
not the authority to neglect wildlife
protect wildlife on public lands,"
and exclude a state from protecting wildlife on and off public lands.
Indeed, the123management of wildlife on the NER has been found
"negligent,"
as even the Tenth Circuit recognized in Wyoming. 124
125
As the Supreme Court set out in McCready v. State of Virginia,
126
the regulation of wildlife is the province of the states.
In view of the clear distinction between state and national
power on the subject, long settled... [the provisions of
legislation aimed at regulating wildlife] must be construed
as alone applicable to the subject within the authority of
held not to embrace
Congress to regulate, and, therefore, be127
power.
such
within
not
that which was

117. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2., which states, "The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Propertybelonging to the United States...." (emphasis added).
118. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 546.
121. Id. at 543 ("Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over
federal lands within its territory, but Congress...retains the power to enact legislation
respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause.").
122. Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
123. Parker Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 477, 484 (D. Wyo.
1992).
124. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1239.
125. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
126. Id. at 395.
127. Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. at 175.
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Given that wildlife management has long been the province of
the states and is largely undertaken by states even on federal lands, 128
the authority to manage terrestrial game animals on federal lands
presented a quandary entitled to more examination than given by the
court in Wyoming. 129 While there are many new and aggressive pieces of
legislation that delve into this state-dominated area, 130 the focus of this
analysis concerns the state's Tenth Amendment claim, not preemption
under the Improvement Act. With the deference and attention given to
state authority by the Supreme Court in wildlife cases, 131 it appears
incongruent for this court to dismiss Wyoming's claim with hardly a
discussion thereof. Even if the Tenth Circuit's decision regarding the
Tenth Amendment (as a basis for state management of wildlife on
federal lands within states) is consistent with Supreme Court precedent,
its method of analysis is clearly not.
B. Preemption under the Improvement Act
The court based its preemption analysis upon the language of
the Improvement Act itself.132 The Wyoming court's analysis and method
of resolving apparently conflicting portions of the Act are problematic,
not only for the inherent contradictions, but also because it undercuts the
intent of the National Wildlife Refuge System itself. 133 Moreover, the
implications of this interpretation of the Improvement Act could be
surprising and undesirable. Even so, there are extra-judicial remedies
that may be employed to remedy any results that Congress did not
intend. 134
The court concluded that the state was preempted from
vaccinating elk on the NER largely because of its interpretation of the
128. See supranotes 46, 113.
129. This becomes an even larger concern when these terrestrial game animals have
high rates of disease and present threats to livestock and wild game outside of federal
lands, as is the case here. Even so, this presents an additional issue, whether the states have
the authority to protect their investments and their citizens from the negligence of federal
activities on federal lands when the effects of these activities are likely to extend outside of
federal lands.
130. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000); Marine Mammal
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (2000); Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703712 (2000); Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668 et seq. (2000).
131. See generally Hunt, 278 U.S. 96; Holland,252 U.S. 416; Geer, 161 U.S. 519, overruled on
other grounds by Hughes, 441 U.S. 322; McCready, 94 U.S. 391.
132. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1218, 1227-28.
133. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000) ("the conservation, management, and where
appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within
the United States for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans").
134. See infra Part V.B.

1298

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

Improvement Act's "mission." 135 Focusing on the court's parallel
conclusion that the only way to achieve this purpose would be for the
Act to exclude any exercise of authority by the states unless the agency
communicates otherwise, 136 the court found that the Act must have been
intended to preempt state authority. 137 This conclusion is inherently
vulnerable in light of the fact that the Act also states that "[n]othing in
this Act shall be construed as affecting the authority, jurisdiction, or
responsibility of the several States to manage, control, or regulate fish
and resident wildlife under State law or regulations in any area within
the System." 138 It does not necessarily follow that one of the provisions
must be completely ignored in an effort to resolve apparently
contradictory provisions; especially here, where the goal of the state
action is the improvement of the health and safety of wildlife inside the
refuge, as well as outside.
The court's interpretation in Wyoming is a prime example of
form over substance. 139 Even if the court's conclusion is correct,
adherence to the decision is contrary to the goal of the Act: providing
refuge for wildlife. Specifically, by allowing the USFWS to negligently
and injuriously manage the NER 14° because the Improvement Act allows
them to preempt state action, 141 the elk are exposed to an increased risk
of disease and subsequent sterility, lameness, or death. Since the main
142
the
purpose of the NER is to provide a healthy environment for elk,
Wyoming
the
under
secondary
primary purpose of the NER becomes
decision.
43
it only
Since states are the primary managers of wildlife,
seems logical that states should have the authority to manage terrestrial
game animals so that their populations are healthy, outbreaks of disease

135. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1228, 1233-34.
136. Id. at 1234.
137. Id.
138. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2000).
139. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993) (holding
that the Establishment Clause does not act as an absolute bar to placing a public employee
in a "sectarian" school because it would "exalt form over substance").
140. Wyoming v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1222-23 (D. Wyo. 1999), affid in part
and rev'd in part, 279 F.3d 1214 (2002) (The court characterized the agency's actions as
"playing out a stalling game."); Parker Land & Cattle Co., 796 F. Supp. at 486 (The court
characterized the agency's management of the NER as "negligent" and "unreasonable.").
141. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234.
142. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000).
143. See supranote 113.
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are prevented, 144 and wildlife is managed in such a way as to protect
animal populations. This is especially true in instances on federal land
where the federal government has failed to manage wildlife in order to
achieve these goals. 145 In essence, the problem in Wyoming can be easily
characterized as one of disease and health management, not simply as an
issue of land or wildlife management. As such, it becomes absurd to
conclude that a relatively small parcel of land can be permitted to
exempt itself from a disease prevention program and expect that the
program will be effective. 146
Another possible unintended implication under the Wyoming
decision is that any state wildlife management action can be precluded
from taking place on national wildlife refuges if the USFWS decides that
it should not occur. 147 Thus, state action that is beneficial to wildlife, as
was the case in Wyoming, can be proscribed under the Improvement Act.
As stated before, this is contrary to the purpose of the National Wildlife
Refuge System itself and leads to the possibility of absurd results. 148 For
example, if a highway traverses a national wildlife refuge, the federal
144. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) ("Inspection laws, quarantine
laws, health laws of every description....No direct general power over these objects has
been granted to Congress.").
145. See Parker Land & Cattle Co., 796 F. Supp. at 484; Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1239.
146. The threat of smaller, isolated areas that inadequately control and remedy the
spread of infectious diseases has been justification to allow an authority responsible for the
whole population to step in and manage the area for the good of the larger population at
risk. This is exemplified in the Public Health Service, Department of Health, and Human
Services Regulations titled "Measure in the Event of Inadequate Local Control," which
pertain to much more mobile human populations. 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2002).
Whenever the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
determines that the measures taken by health authorities of any State or
possession (including political subdivisions thereof) are insufficient to
prevent the spread of any of the communicable diseases from such State or
possession to any other State or possession, he/she may take such measures to
prevent such spread of the diseases as he/she deems reasonably
necessary, including inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest
extermination, and destruction of animals or articles believed to be sources
of infection.
Id. (emphasis added). In this case, there is a wildlife population consisting of organisms
that enter and exit a national wildlife refuge (the logical result is entrance into areas for
which state authorities are responsible) as they will. National management of wildlife
populations modeled after 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2002) is not reasonable because terrestrial
wildlife is not nearly as mobile as human populations that can travel by plane, train, and
automobile, and because of additional problems associated with application. In the
Wyoming case, the state would be the larger authority when compared with the NER for
purposes of the health and disease control analysis. This is inherently obvious due to the
fact that the NER is enclosed within the state.
147. See, e.g., Wyoming, 279 F.3d 1214.
148. Id.
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government has the authority to exclude the patrol of state veterinary
emergency response teams. This situation is oxymoronic because the
purpose of the emergency response team would be to assist animals and
animal populations in mortal danger. State action, such as implementing
veterinary emergency response teams, would be especially valuable and
effective in situations where the federal government did not provide
similar services to save or protect these animals. Further confounding the
intent of legislation like the Improvement Act, the only reason the state is
precluded from assisting these animals is that they happen to be injured
while passing through federal property. Precluding the state from
performing these actions is an absurd result; a result that is not
persuasive in light of the fundamental goals of legislation that attempts
to bring about increased numbers and the improved health of organisms
for which wildlife refuges are established.
Essentially, Wyoming muddles the goal of the Improvement Act.
The goal of this legislation was not to have the federal government
regulate and care for various parcels of land, as the court contends, but
to manage these parcels of land for a particular purpose: to create areas
for wildlife to find refuge. 149 The only reason authority to manage these
lands was consolidated within the federal government was "for the
conservation of fish and wildlife, including species that are threatened
50
with extinction."1
The court in Wyoming based its finding of preemption largely on
the implication that the mission of the Act was "to administer a national
network of lands." 151 This is especially awkward because this phrase is
taken entirely out of context. The entire provision reads, "The mission of
the System is to administer a national network of lands and waters for the
conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish,
wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United States for
152
the benefit of present and future generations of Americans."
From the language of the Act, it is obvious that the
administration of a "national network of lands and waters" is only a
method of achieving the primary goal of the Improvement Act, "the
149. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(1) (2000) ("For the purpose of consolidating the authorities
relating to the various categories of areas that are administered by the Secretary for the
conservation of fish and wildlife, including species that are threatened with extinction, all
lands, waters, and interests therein administered by the Secretary as wildlife refuges, areas
for the protection and conservation of fish and wildlife that are threatened with extinction,
wildlife ranges, game ranges, wildlife management areas, or waterfowl production
areas....").
150. Id.
151. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234.
152. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
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conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the
fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats.... 153 Since this is
Congress's primary goal in enacting the Improvement Act, the Wyoming
court appears to have based its finding of preemption on an incorrect
interpretation of the Act's purpose.
Oddly enough, the incorrect basis for the court's finding of
preemption allowed preclusion of state action that undertakes to
promote the purpose of the Improvement Act by improving the refuge
environment for wildlife. It seems axiomatic that actions promoting the
purpose of the Improvement Act should be undertaken, and those that
are contrary prohibited. If so, Congress would have intended the federal
government to adopt or permit enforcement of state laws and policies
that afford better "refuge" for wildlife, not to forego improvements
merely because a state happened to be the entity proactively undertaking
such action. The paramount purpose of the Improvement Act is not
simply to ensure exclusive federal management over national refuge
lands, but involves managing the overall environment and health of
animal populations on these lands. The court's holding omits
consideration of this possibility.
On another front, perhaps Congress could adopt an amendment
to the Improvement Act that would allow states to intervene in instances
such as the one faced in Wyoming. Multiple courts found the
management of the NER to be much less than satisfactory. 15 4 Courts

should not be required to openly reprimand federal agencies and, at the
same time, have no remedies available to rectify situations where federal
agencies are "unable or unwilling" to do anything. 55
C. Review under the APA

The court's analysis of the state's APA claim is sound in form,
but, in finding that judicial review was not precluded, it relied upon
statements and implications it disregarded under the preemption
analysis to hold the Improvement Act "undoubtedly places limits on the
agency's discretion." 15 6 The Tenth Circuit then ruled that the APA claim
had been improperly dismissed, and the court ultimately relied upon the
Act's requirements to coordinate, interact, and cooperate with state
153. Id.
154. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1239; Wyoming v. United States, 61 F. Supp.2d 1209, 1222-23
(D. Wyo. 1999), affd in part and rev'd in part, 279 F.3d 1214 (2002); Parker Land & Cattle Co.,
796 F. Supp. at 484.
155. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1240.
156. Id. at 1237.
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wildlife agencies 157 to find legislative intent to limit the authority
granted to the agency and allow judicial review. 15 Thus, it is ironic that
the court relied upon the Act's protection of state authority to find
limitation that justifies judicial review, 159 while at the same time
161
6
disregarding these constraints' 0 under the preemption analysis.
Disregarding and applying the same provisions in various contexts
injects unpredictability into the interpretation of the Improvement Act.
In other words, confusion is created when one tries to determine which
provisions will be regarded and disregarded in varying contexts.
Such interpretation allows for some portions of the Act to be
disregarded, while other portions may be interpreted in ways that do not
reflect the text of the legislation. Specifically, by interpreting provisions
that require the agency to coordinate, interact, and cooperate with
states 162 to allow judicial review, 163 and at the same time disregarding an
entire provision of the Act'64 to find implied preemption, 165 there is
unpredictability in the interpretation and application of the
Improvement Act. Courts should attempt to reconcile differences in
interpretations before concluding with one that disregards significant
portions of a piece of legislation such that only a portion of a sentence is
used to determine its goal.166 Section 668dd(m)167 of the Improvement
157. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(e) (2000).
158. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1237.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1234.
161. While courts may approach certain questions differently and the standards of
review may not be the same (between determining whether judicial review of agency
decisions is permitted within an Act and whether preemption is intended under the same
Act), practically speaking, when the very same provisions are disregarded in one context
and held inviolable in another, an atmosphere of uncertainty is created.
162. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(E) (2000).
163. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1237.
164. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2000).
165. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234.
166. Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989) ("'[11n expounding a statute, we
[are] not.., guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions
of the whole law, and to its object and policy.'" (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481
U.S. 41, 51 (1987))).
167. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2000).
State Authority: Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting the authority,
jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States to manage, control, or regulate fish and
resident wildlife under State law or regulations in any area within the System. Regulations
permitting hunting or fishing of fish and resident wildlife within the System shall be, to the
extent practicable, consistent with State fish and wildlife laws, regulations, and
management plans.
Id.
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Act should be interpreted in such a way as to give effect to its language,
especially in light of giving substantial effect to subsection
668dd(a)(4)(e). 168
In this case, section 668dd(m) does not need to be disregarded.
This section can be interpreted to allow states to act in the best interest of
the wildlife for which a federal wildlife refuge has been established. At
the same time, the Act can give effect to the federal administration of
lands requirement through imposition of minimum management
requirements.
Under the proposed and aforementioned interpretation, the
traditional status of states as wildlife managers would be upheld, and
the states could manage populations of wildlife on national wildlife
refuges to ensure their continued health and existence through consistent
wildlife management. Under this scenario, states would be free to
engage in more stringent management standards than required under
the Improvement Act. This would both ensure that the federal
government can "administer a national network of lands" 169 and that it
can provide "for the conservation, management, and where appropriate,
restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats
within the United States for the benefit of present and future generations
of Americans." 170 Since the latter goal may be achieved by more assertive
undertakings, states would logically be welcome to do so under the
spirit and language of the Improvement Act. This interpretation would
also give force and recognition to the Act where it states that "[n]othing
in this Act shall be construed as affecting the authority, jurisdiction, or
responsibility of the several States to manage, control, or regulate fish
and resident wildlife under State law or regulations in any area within the
System."171
D. Problems Presented by Wyoming to Wildlife Management under
the Tenth Amendment and State Sovereignty
States have historically been, and continue to be, the entities
with primary responsibility of managing wildlife. 172 The few exceptions
168. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(E) (2000) ("In administering the System, the Secretary
shall-ensure effective coordination, interaction, and cooperation with owners of land
adjoining refuges and the fish and wildlife agency of the States in which the units of the
System are located.").
169. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1234 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000)).
170. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000).
171. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m) (2000) (emphasis added).
172. 43 C.F.R. § 24.3 (2002); Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166; Geer, 161 U.S. 519, overruled on
other grounds by Hughes, 441 U.S. 322; McCready, 94 U.S. 391; Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1.
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have arisen mainly out of treaties and out of both the Property and
Supremacy Clauses. 173 Nonetheless, there is sound justification for state
dominance in this arena. If disease spreads through Wyoming's elk and
cattle herds, the citizens of Wyoming are likely to hold state officials
174
After all, "where the
accountable for any negligent management.
it may be state
regulate,
to
States
the
directs
Federal Government
the federal
while
disapproval,
public
of
brunt
officials who will bear the
from
insulated
remain
may
program
officials who devised the regulatory
175
the
of
Court
Supreme
The
the electoral ramifications of their decision."
the
preclude
to
United States has extended the "accountability doctrine"
their
of
federal government from directing state "officers, or those
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program." 176 It reasonably follows that the federal government would
not be able to preclude "the meaningful accomplishment of [a state's]
177
In both circumstances the federal
responsibilities" to its citizens.
to act (or refrain from acting)
government
state
government is directing
be attributed to state officers.
to
likely
are
such that any negative impacts
state action that prevents
preempt
to
If Congress truly intended
domesticated animals,
and
the spread of disease through wild game
78
then, at the very least, it should make a clear statement to that effect.
Since animals are not considered a part of the land due to their ability to
come and go and because the federal government does not own
wildlife, 179 it is difficult to rationalize the ability of Congress to preempt
state authority on the basis of the Property Clause alone. Federal
ownership of a certain parcel of land within a state does not necessarily
equate to the federal government having exclusive control over wildlife
that just happens to be on that piece of property at a particular point in
time. 180 Eventually, these animals leave federal lands and may spread
disease, causing the federal government's negligence to be instrumental
181
The results could
in expanding the scope and damage of outbreak.
leave the state's fish and wildlife agency to explain why hunters fill their
bag limits at the lowest rates they have experienced; or the state may be
left to explain to conservation organizations why their members are no
173. 43 C.F.R. § 24.3 (2002).
174. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
175. Id. at 169.
176. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
177. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1241.
178. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230;
TRIBE, supra note 25, § 6-31.
179. See supra note 111.
180. Id.
181. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1219.
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longer able to view and photograph healthy wildlife; or the state's
agricultural department could be left to explain why all of the dairies in
the state are closed, cattle are being slaughtered to stem the spread of
disease, and prices for cheese, milk, steak, and hamburger have risen to
the highest levels ever experienced.
States also have an inherent responsibility to protect the health
and welfare of their citizens. 8 2 A state must have some recourse rapidly
available when a federal agency endangers the public health and safety
of citizens in a particular state or group of states. For instance, suppose
the federal government was experimenting with bats on federal land by
attaching incendiary devices to the hapless creatures, such that when
they were motionless for a certain period of time the device would
detonate. 83 Now suppose the federal government's new comrades in
arms regularly left the federal lands while foraging or to migrate,
resulting in the destruction and endangerment of people and property
outside of federal lands. The state should not be required to stand by
helpless to protect its citizens because the Property Clause allows the
federal government to do as it pleases on federal lands, "regardless of
the circumstances" and regardless of the effects outside of the federal
land. As the Supreme Court has stated,
[the] immense mass of legislation, which embraces every
thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the
[federal]
government:
all which
can
be most
advantageously exercised by the States themselves.
Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every
description...are component parts of this mass. No direct
general power over these objects is granted to Congress; and,
consequently, they remain subject to State legislation. If the
legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must be
for national purposes; it must be where the power is
expressly given for a special purpose, or is clearly
incidental to some power which is expressly given. 8 4
In Wyoming, the problem begins with a local elk population that
travels in and out of federal lands. 185 The state manages the elk
population in and out of federal land through the promulgation of
182. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 205; see also Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1241.
183. A Batty Idea for Firebombing Tokyo, in WILLIAM B. BREUER, TOP SECRET TALES OF
WORLD WAR II at 123 (2000) (The actual experimentation and use of napalm incendiary
devices on bats resulted in the escape of some bats and accidental destruction of U.S.
buildings.).
184. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203-04 (emphasis added).
185. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1219.
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hunting regulations and additional programs to monitor and maintain
the health of the herd. 186 The USFWS makes the decision not to adopt
prudent methods to stem the spread of a disease affecting ungulates on
the NER because they happen to be on this federal land at a certain point
in time. 187 In this instance, it is difficult to discern the overriding national
purpose in preempting state management of local elk populations.
Furthermore, there is no power that is clearly incidental to the
preemption of state management over terrestrial game animals not in
danger of extinction.1 8 In fact, the district court has repeatedly found the
federal actions at the NER to be counterproductive to elk
management. 189 Unfortunately, this does not seem to be an isolated
incident of federal agencies apparently contradicting legislation, and
190
themselves, to the detriment of the species involved.
The federal government has in the past been required to
demonstrate injury or the possibility of injury by wildlife in order to
191
violate state law pertaining to wildlife management on federal lands.
186. Id. at 1220; Wyoming Game and Fish Dep't, 2002 Deer Hunting Season, available at
http://gf.state.wy.us/admin/regulations/chapter6/ch6deer.htm (last updated Apr. 22,
2003) (defining hunting seasons and bag limits for federal and non-federal lands).
187. Wyoming, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1222-23, affd in partand rev'd in part, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th
Cir. 2002); Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1239.
188. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203-04. A finding of preemption is especially problematic in
this case, where the statute is, at best, unclear about congressional intent to preempt state
management through the Property Clause. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1240 ("If the executive and
legislative branches of our Government will not act to resolve the brucellosis controversy in
the State of Wyoming in what little time remains, the judicial branch may have to."); id. at
1233 ("The main legislative theory seems to be on the order of 'let's just muddle through as
best we can and let the courts handle the hard cases."') (quoting George Cameron Coggins
& Michael E. Ward, The Law of Wildlife Management on Federal Public Lands, 60 OR. L. REV.
59, 84-85 (1981)); Wyoming, 61 F. Supp.2d at 1223 ("this patchwork of federal law").
189. Wyoming, 61 F. Supp.2d at 1222-23 (characterizing the agency's actions as "playing
out a stalling game"); Parker Land & Cattle Co., 796 F. Supp. at 486, 488 (characterizing the
agency's management of the NER as "negligent" and "unreasonable").
190. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation, The Best & Worst for Wildlife, available at
http://nwf.org/bestandworst/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2003. For example,
[tlhe big cat's [Florida Panther] power, stealth and cunning are proving no
match for the apathy of the federal agencies mandated to protect it. Fewer
than 100 Florida panthers remain in the wild, yet throughout the past year,
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service consistently refused to protect the very
habitat it deemed essential to the recovery of the federally endangered cat.
In the past decade, the agency has approved the destruction of more than
6,000 acres of panther habitat. Development plans for tens of thousands of
additional acres appear to be headed for similar rubber stamping, making
way for golf courses, vacation homes and shopping centers....edging out
this sensitive creature.
Id.
191. See N.M. State Game Comm'n, 410 F.2d at 1201; Hunt,278 U.S. at 100.
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The Eighth Circuit has recently held that the federal government can
regulate activity outside of federal property in order to reduce any
negative impacts on federal lands that emanate from outside of the
federal lands. 192 Under this line of reasoning, when the federal
government conducts, or fails to regulate, activities that are equally
detrimental to state lands and their purposes,193 it is reasonable to
conclude that the state should also have the authority to regulate the
activities causing negative impacts. 9 4
VI. CONCLUSION
It is troubling that the court chose to interpret the Improvement
Act as preempting state law that addresses areas that federal law does
not, especially when the intent to preempt is clearly questionable. 195
Perhaps it would be better if Congress specifically and completely
preempted state authority or decided to forfeit altogether wildlife
management authority gained by the federal government since the early
twentieth century. These are both all or nothing approaches for either the
federal or state governments to assume exclusive control, and since there
appears to be a more effective method of wildlife management in
concurrent jurisdiction situations, those options may not be the best
available. For example, the framework of the Improvement Act can be
interpreted to provide minimum management requirements for state
agencies, reminiscent of other federal environmental legislation.'%
Under that interpretation, if particular states were unable or unwilling to
implement the Improvement Act, then the federal government would do
so.
At least for the purpose of wildlife management on national
wildlife refuges, it appears the term "dual sovereignty" could be
replaced with the term "dueling sovereignties." No quarrel can be had
with the Wyoming court's conclusion that cooperation is integral in this
192. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir.1999).
193. These activities may also affect federal lands just as negatively, and, since these
lands are public, it is logical that the state may also have a duty to ensure that these federal
public lands within the state are not being negatively impacted without justification.
194. Of course, such interpretation would not extend to activities that are minimally
detrimental or activities concerning legitimate national interests, such as national defense.
Here we are limited to discussing the environmental impacts on areas set aside for
preservation of some sort. Examples of some activities that have been found to have
detrimental effects on such reservations are the use of off-road vehicles and watercraft in
waterfowl refuges. See Block, 660 F.2d 1240.
195. Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1218.
196. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2002); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7407
(2002).
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field and, in this case, there was far too little, if any. 197 This is a case
where the court gives great latitude and deference to the agency's
interpretation of the Act. If the agency's interpretation, preemption of all
state wildlife management on national wildlife refuges, is truly the
situation intended by Congress, then "dual sovereignty" in the context of
wildlife management is not present. This then creates additional tension
with the Improvement Act's requirements that stipulate federal
compliance and consistency with state law, because state law in this area
would be null.
The Wyoming court states that "[i]f the executive and legislative
branches of our Government will not act to resolve the brucellosis
controversy in the State of Wyoming in what little time remains, the
judicial branch may have to." 198 However, the entity acting most
affirmatively to resolve this problem is clearly the state of Wyoming.
This is likely due to the state's constituents having a large stake in the
outcome of the brucellosis problem in Wyoming. Nevertheless, the court
perceives the legislation it reviewed to be unclear and contradictory but
has decided to bind itself tightly with the agency and its interpretation.
All the while the court acknowledges the agency's apparent
shortcomings in wielding its awesome and exclusive powers over
wildlife management on national wildlife refuges. 199 And, all the while,
"the poor, dumb creatures of the wild suffer as this disease spreads
while the [USIFWS dithers...." 200

197.
198.
199.
200.

Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1218.
Id. at 1240.
Id.at 1241.
Wyoming, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.

